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ON THE LIABILITY OF CORPORATE
DIRECTORS TO HOLDERS OF SECURITIES
FOR ILLEGAL CORPORATE ACTS:

CAN THE TENSION BETWEEN THE "NETLOSS" AND
"NO-DUTY-TO-DISCLOSE" RULES BE
RESOLVED
Geoffrey Rapp*

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 5, 1999, a federal district judge in Washington,
D.C. handed down a decision suggesting that the software
megafirm Microsoft had engaged in illegal anti-competitive
business practices for two decades.' In the wake of this decision,
the media noted that private antitrust plaintiffs were lining up to
file civil actions to recover damages suffered as a consequence of
Microsoft's illegal conduct.2 Companies which experienced low
sales and diminished market share as a result of Microsoft's illegal
acts, ranging from rival software firms to Internet startups, were
seen as potential litigants, as were consumers who purchased
. Adjunct Professor, Wayne State University Law School; Law Clerk
Cornelia G. Kennedy (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit); J.D.,
Yale Law School; A.B., Harvard College (Economics).
1. See Bill Straub, Chesley v. Microsoft: Two Giants Face Off, CINCINNATI
POST, Jan. 12,2000, at 1A.
2- See, e.g., id.; Lee Gomes, Microsoft Agrees to Settle Suit by Caldera,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2000, at 7 (describing forty private law suits filed in
the wake of Judge Jackson's ruling that Microsoft had engaged in anticompetitive behavior); David Wilson, Experts Are Divided on Strategy for
Microsoft Class Action Suits, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEwS, Nov. 23, 1999 ("a wave

of class action suits builds across the country...."), reprintedin KNIGHT-RIDDER
TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Court Decision on Microsoft Could Embolden Litigation:
Private Lawsuits Expected in the Wake of FederalAction, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov.
9, 1999, at D10 ("a flurry of fresh lawsuits...").
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Microsoft products at inflated prices.3
One immediate consequence of the judge's ruling was that the
value of Microsoft stock plummeted, falling by nearly five percent
in the following week and a half.4 The media paid little attention to
the possibility that this result of the judge's decision (rather than
the judge's legal findings) could prompt litigation against
Microsoft. Millions of Americans hold stock in Microsoft Their
investment portfolios took a hit once the federal judge found
Microsoft behaved as a monopolist. Yet the media did not seem to
think that these investors would have any claim against the
directors of Microsoft for the illegal acts that led to the decline in
the value of Microsoft shares.6
The absence in the business press of any suggestion that
Microsoft shareholders might seek to recoup their losses through a
derivative action against the company's directors is not surprising.
Courts have created a muddled law governing the liability of
corporate directors to holders of securities for the illegal acts of a
corporation.7 This confusion has led to an absence of attention.
Conflicting judicial opinions have led the media, and perhaps even
legal scholars,' to shy away from the topic.
This Article explores the liability of corporate directors to
3. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2.
4. See Arthur M. Lewis, Rethinking: Microsoft Stock, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 16,
1999, at Cl; cf. Richard Croft, Investing Options: How to Play the Microsoft

Game, NAT. POST, Nov. 16, 1999, at D3 ("The growth in the company's share
price will by hampered by Judge Jackson's ruling.").
5. See Straub, supra note 1, at 1A.
6. A review of articles mentioning "pending" or "likely" litigation turns up
no articles suggesting shareholder claims against Microsoft directors.
7. See United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 48 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The full
extent of the obligation to disclose such information is uncertain in light of
existing cases."). For a review of the case law concerning general liability of
directors for the illegal acts of the corporation, see Norwood P. Beveridge, Does
the Corporate Director Have A Duty Always to Obey the Law?, 45 DEPAUL L.
REV. 729 (1996).
& See Eric D. Roiter, Illegal Corporate Practices and the Disclosure
Requirements of the Federal Securities Laws, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 781, 782
(1982) ("The decisions in this area do not lend themselves to such an
undertaking; a number have been settled by consent, and others have been
decided with little attempt by the courts to enunciate principled standards.").
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shareholders for the illegal acts of corporations. It suggests that
there is a tension between two lines of cases that results in the
systematic injustice for a specific class of holders of corporate
securities. The first line of cases - from the state courts consists of Shareholder Derivative Suits ("SDSs") filed by
aggrieved shareholders against directors, and establishes the socalled "net-loss" principle.9 To sue a company's directors for
damages resulting from illegal acts (typically a decline in share
price resulting from imminent governmental punishment), a
shareholder would need to establish that the loss in share price
resulting from the illegal act outweighs the gain in share price
resulting from the increased sales or profits the illegal act
produced. The idea is that a shareholder who enjoyed the run-up
in the value of Microsoft common stock that resulted from Bill
Gates's aggressive and evidently illegal industrial strategy should
not now be able to sue to recover the decline in share value
resulting from the federal district court's holding that that strategy
violated the Sherman Act." Only if the illegal acts resulted in a
"net loss" could directors be held to have breached their fiduciary
obligation to maximize share price.
The second line of cases from the federal courts approaches
the liability of corporate directors for illegal acts of the corporation
not from the perspective of the duty to maximize corporate value
under state law, but rather from the perspective of the duty to
disclose under federal securities laws." This line of cases holds that
corporate directors are not liable for failing to disclose that a
corporation is engaged in an illegal act." Couched in the Fifth
Amendment's protection against self-incrimination, these cases

9.

See Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 763 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974) (applying New

York law); see also Diamond v. Davis, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582, 583-84 (N.Y. App. Div.
1941); Barden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S. 902, 903 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962); Spinella v.
Heights Ice Corp., 62 N.Y.S.2d 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946).

10. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
11. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980); see also
Roeda v. Alpha Indus., Inc. 814 F.2d 22,26-28 (1st Cir. 1987).
12 See Roeda, 814 F.2d at 26-28; see also Amalgamated Clothing & Textile
Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens Co., 475 F. Supp. 328, 331-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980).
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conclude that there is no affirmative duty to disclose. 3
This Article suggests that a tension between the net loss
principle and the no-duty-to-disclose rule produces systematic
injustice for a specific class of shareholder: those who bought the
stock after the market had taken into account the positive results of
the illegal conduct such as higher sales, higher profits, and faster
growth, but before the disclosure that the corporation was engaged
in illegal conduct. Because of the no-duty-to-disclose rule, these
shareholders did not know that the corporation in which they were
investing was engaged in illegal acts, and thus cannot be said to
have accepted the risk of government sanction for the chance of
high returns. Even if there was no net loss, however, these
shareholders will have suffered mightily. Particularly, these
shareholders bought after the stock price had risen on account of
the benefits of the corporation's illegal acts and therefore did not
enjoy any of the gains from the illegal conduct. Nevertheless, they
will suffer all of the pain once that conduct is discovered or
disclosed.
This injustice might not be something to worry about. The
"efficient markets hypothesis" of financial economists holds that
stock prices reflect future expectations of earnings based on all
presently available information."
A strong-form "efficient
markets" hypothesis suggests that insider trading would produce
market valuations discounted by the risk that the company's illegal
acts would be discovered. 5 However, the best evidence suggests
that this strict form efficient markets hypothesis is not valid in the
real world, particularly in light of aggressive anti-insider trading
laws. 6
A second way to make sense of this tension is to argue that it is
not a significant problem, given the criminal law's deterrent effects
13. See United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1986).
14. See Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics:
Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levison, 77 VA. L.
REv. 1017, 1022-1024 (1991) (citing G. ALEXANDER & W. SHARPE,
FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTMENTS 67 (1989)).
15. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad
Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-On-The-MarketTheory, 42 STAN. L. REv.
1059, 1077-1082 (1990).
16. See id. at 1091.
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Perhaps criminal law
on illegal behavior by corporations.
combined with the incentive pay structure facing corporate
directors so deters illegal acts by corporations that one need not
worry that investors will regularly suffer injustice. However, the
nature of option pay - with directors rewarded for stock gains but
not sufficiently punished for losses - means that directors will
take more risks with respect to the law than shareholders might
hope.17 As a result, the deterrent effect of criminal law is not
substantial enough to discount the injustice resulting from the
tension between the no-duty-to-disclose rule and the net-loss rule.
The fact that this tension exists is in some sense surprising,
given the historic pattern of the development of American
corporate law. 8 The regulation of corporate law has been
increasingly federalized with the emphasis now placed on financial
9
markets governed by federal securities regulation. At the same
time, state laws remain in effect.' One would tend to think that
the presence of two overlapping sources of corporate law would
create redundancies. Specifically, a given issue would tend to be
governed by too much, rather than too little, corporate law. That
any shareholders would not receive adequate protection would
therefore be surprising. The tension described in this Article is an
example of an issue "slipping through the cracks." Perhaps the
overlapping nature of state and federal corporate law leads both
state lawmakers and federal securities regulators to assume that
the other is or will be responsible for protecting a particular class
of shareholder.' As this Article will argue, such faith is misplaced.
17. The tension between investor preference and manager behavior, of
course, arises from the agency costs inherent in the relationship. Since
monitoring is an imperfect and expensive solution, manager-agents engage in
For a
"hidden actions" against interests of the shareholder-principals.
C.
Geoffrey
see
description of the literature on the principal-agent problem,
Rapp, Agency and Choice in Education, 8 EDuc. ECON. 37, 38-39 (2000).
18. See Philip C. Berg, The Limits of SEC Authority Under Section 14(A) of
the Exchange Act: Where Federal Disclosure Ends and State Corporate
Governance Begins, 17 J. CORP. L. 311, 312-15 (1992) (citing Donald R.
Schwartz, Federalismand CorporateGovernance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545 (1984)).

19.
20.

See id.
See id.

21. See Eric Chiappinnelli, The Moral Basis of State Law Disclosure, 49
CATH. U. L. REv. 697, 714 (2000) ("The law and economics theory asks whether
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Part I of this Article describes the emergence of the net-loss
and no-duty-to-disclose rules in corporate law. It includes a review
of the major cases establishing and defining the two doctrines, and
the proffered justifications for each. Part II of the Article
describes the tension between these two rules and how this tension
systematically deprives a class of shareholders of its right to
recover. Part III of the Article considers whether the efficient
markets hypothesis or the criminal law provides a reason for
discounting the tension between these two rules. Finally, Part IV
suggests avenues for reform.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE NET-Loss
AND No-DUTY-TO-DISCLOSE RULES

Corporate directors generally have a legal duty to obey the
law.' Directors who knowingly cause the corporation to disobey
the law, under the American Law Institute's Principles of
Corporate Governance, violate their fiduciary duty of care.' In
theory, at least, shareholders have a right to recover from
corporate directors for the illegal acts in which they cause a
corporation to engage. ' In the modern era, however, very few
courts have held directors liable to shareholders for illegal acts.'
the states or federal government are the more appropriate regulator of corporate
disclosure

... ").

22
See Beveridge, supra note 7, at 729 ("It is taken for granted that the
corporate board of directors has a duty to adopt and enforce policies and
procedures regarding institutional compliance with law.") (citing Corporate
Director's Guidebook 1994 Edition, 49 Bus. LAW. 1243, 1249, 1251, 1267 (1994));

see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and
Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945 (1990) ("Corporate directors and officers are
under three general legal duties: the duty to act carefully, the duty to act loyally,
and the duty to act lawfully.").
23. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§2.01(b)(1) cmt. g, 4.01 crmt. d (1994) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].

24.
25.

See Beveridge, supra note 7, at 730.
In 1977, one scholar found no modem cases of that sort. See John C.

Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099,
1173 (1977). In the intervening years, at least one court has found such liability.
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This is primarily due to two competing principles: (1) shareholders
must show the illegal act resulted in a net loss;26 and (2)
corporations have no duty to disclose illegal acts under federal
securities laws.'
A. THE NET-LOSS RULE
The "net-loss" rule emerged in a line of New York SDSs
concerning corporate antitrust law abuses.' Like all SDSs, these
suits faced a number of procedural and substantive obstacles.29 The
basic theory of a shareholder derivative suit is that
managers/directors of a corporation are liable to the corporation
for failing to exercise reasonable care or act with loyalty with
respect to the corporation." Shareholders have standing derived

See discussion infra Part I(B)(3). Other than those described in that Part, there
are several defenses available to corporate directors sued by shareholders for
their illegal acts, which may help explain the absence of rulings against directors.
One particularly powerful defense is reliance on the advice of legal counsel.
Where corporate directors relied on the opinion of counsel as to the legality of
the corporation's behavior, they are only liable to the extent that their reliance
was unreasonable. See Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241, 246-48 (2d Cir. 1956); see
also Beveridge, supra note 7, at 741; Douglas W. Hawes & Thomas J. Sherrard,
Reliance on Advice of Counsel as Defense in Corporate and Securities Cases, 62
State laws
VA. L. REv. 1 (1976) (describing the doctrine of reliance).
on the
based
actions
to
bar
another
indemnifying corporate directors may be
(although
745-750,
at
7,
note
supra
illegal conduct of corporations. See Beveridge,
such statutes will likely not apply where the circumstances indicate the directors
knowingly and willfully caused the corporation to violate the law).
26. See Norman S. Poser, The Eighth Abraham L. Pomeranty Lecture: The
Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 8 (1999) (stating that
there is a "net loss" requirement for shareholder suits).
27. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Security and Exchange Commission's
Administrative, Enforcement, and Legislative Programs and Policies - Their
Influence on Corporate Internal Affairs, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 173, 201
(1982).
28. See Beveridge, supra note 7, at 736-37.
29. See id. at 737 ("After the commencement of the derivative action, the
board created a special litigation committee.").
30. See id. at 730 ("The conventional wisdom seems to be that the
shareholders may have the right to hold the board of directors liable if it was the
directors that caused the corporation to break the law.").
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from their partial ownership of the corporation.3
The first SDSs based on harm resulting from illegal acts of
corporations did not embrace the idea that shareholders need to
show a net loss in order to recover from corporate directors.32 In
the classic and since over-ruled 1909 New York case of Roth v.
Robertson, the minority shareholder in an amusement park
company sued the majority shareholder and manager after the
corporation paid a bribe to avoid having to shut down its Niagara
Falls roller coaster on Sundays (in compliance with state law).33
Relying on the now-defunct doctrine of ultra vires, the state
court declared the bribe to be beyond the purposes of the
corporation and ordered the defendant to pay back the corporate
treasury.34 There was no clear harm to the corporation.35 Instead, it
benefited from the bribe, remaining open on Sundays and deriving
profits as a result, and the court's order simply forced the majority
shareholder to pay the cost of the bribe out of his own pocket.36
1. The Emergence of the "Net-Loss" Rule in New York
ShareholderDerivative Suits and its Adoption Elsewhere
More recent New York cases have declined to follow Roth and
instead established a "net-loss" rule. The rule emerged during the
31. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of CorporateBondholders,
65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165, 1192-93 (1990) ("Under classical corporate theory
stockholders are the owners of the corporation and, therefore, are the
appropriate constituents to enforce the duty of loyalty through litigation designed
to redress harm to their assets.") (citing Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395 F. Supp.
276, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1975) rev'd on other grounds,531 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1976)).
32. See Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1909) ("[F]or
reasons of public policy, we are clearly of the opinion that payments of the
corporate funds for such purposes as those disclosed in this case must be
condemned, and officers of a corporation making them held to a strict
accountability and be compelled to refund the amounts so wasted, for the benefit
of the stockholder... .
33. See id.
34. See id. at 351-54.
35. See Beveridge, supra note 7, at 736.

36.

See id.

37. See Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 763 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974) (applying New
York law); see also Diamond v. Davis, 31 N.Y.S.2d 582, 583-84 (N.Y. App. Div.
1941); Borden v. Cohen, 231 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962); Spinella v.
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middle of the twentieth century." To prove damages, plaintiff
shareholders would need to show actual harm to the corporation.39
The mere imposition of a fine by a governmental authority was not
enough to prove harm. ' The net-loss principle has since been
adopted by other leading jurisdictions."
What is the foundation of the net-loss rule? Courts do not
want investors to be able to profit from the illegal acts of the
companies in which they hold securities. If a company engages in
an illegal act that increases stock prices, shareholders enjoy that
income. If the company's illegal behavior is discovered and stock
prices fall, but not below the level at which the stock traded before
the company began to break the law, it would be unjust to allow a
shareholder to recover from the company for the decline in stock
price. To hold otherwise would in effect establish that the
shareholder is entitled to the profits of the illegal acts, in spite of
Courts are
the government's imposition of punishment.
grounds.
policy
understandably reluctant to reach such a result on
That the net-loss rule emerged in the context of antitrust cases
may be somewhat surprising. '2 Directors of companies which
Heights Ice Corp., 62 N.Y.S.2d 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946); Smiles v. Elfred, 149
N.Y.L.J. 14 col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
38. See, e.g., Borden, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 903; Spinella, 62 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
39. See Miller, 507 F.2d at 763 n.5 ("Under New York law, allegation of
breach even of a federal statute is apparently insufficient to state a cause of
action unless the breach caused independent damage to the corporation.").
40. See Spinella, 62 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
41. See, e.g., Citron v. Merritt-Chaptman & Scott Corp., 407 A.2d 1040, 1045
(Del. 1979) (finding no liability where illegal actions benefited the corporation).
The A.L.I. suggests that the net-loss principle was called into doubt by a 1969
New York decision, Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494 (1969). See
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, § 7.18 cmt. e (arguing
that Oreamuno expresses concern that the net-loss rule ignores the possibility
that "an intangible loss to the corporation might arise from adverse publicity and
stigmatization."). Commentators have objected to the A.L.I.'s characterization.
See Beveridge, supra note 7, at 744 ("That [the belief that Oreamuno cast doubt
on the validity of the net-loss rule in New York] is not at all true.").
42. See Borden, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 903 ("No damage is to be inferred from the
conduct of corporate business which happens to violate the Sherman Anti-Trust
[sic] Act unless the acts constituting such violation also cause independent
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violate antitrust laws-like Microsoft in the example discussed
above-may always defend themselves by saying that they
reasonably relied upon the advice of counsel." Bribery and other
clear violations of the law are more common in the recent case law
as a basis for illegal-act liability suits."
2. The American Law Institute Approach
Under the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, the netloss rule should be modified in three ways.45 First, courts would be
prohibited from offsetting losses from one transaction against
profits from a distinct but identical transaction.' Second, courts
could refuse to offset profits that they find contrary to public
policy.47 Third, corporations would have the burden of proving that
the illegal act resulted in profits.'
These are sensible modifications. '9 If a company's directors
cause it to offer bribes to two separate officials, and the result of
one leads to a net gain and the other to a net loss, those directors
should nevertheless be liable for the loss resulting from the "bad"
bribe." Moreover, giving courts the de jure power to decline to
damage to the corporation, and were against the interests and the benefits of the
corporation.").
43. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
44. See cases cited supra note 11.
45. A plaintiff bears the burden of proving causation and the amount of
damages suffered by, or other recovery due to, the corporation or the
shareholders as the result of a defendant's violation of the standard of conduct
[of the Principles]. The court may permit a defendant to offset against such
liability any gains to the corporation that the defendant can establish arose out of
the same transaction and whose recognition in this manner is not contrary to
public policy.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, § 7.18(c).
46. See id. at § 7.18(c), cmt. e.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. But see Beveridge, supra note 7, at 745 ("There is no justification for any
of these changes. The court should have the authority to decide in a particular
case whether or not a corporation has suffered damages as a result of an illegal
course of conduct.").
50. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, § 7.18 cmt.
e ("Only if the five [bribes] were part of the 'Osame transaction' can the gains on
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apply the net-loss rule on policy grounds merely states the factual,
since courts occasionally ignore the rule anyway when policy
considerations justify doing so. Lastly, putting the burden on the
corporation to prove that the illegal acts led to particular profits
means that the party with the most information about the sources
of various income streams will be the one with the incentive to
assist the court in understanding from where a particular income
stream comes."
B. The No-Duty-To-Disclose Rule
Under federal securities laws, corporate directors have an
affirmative duty of disclosure under certain circumstances." Rule
lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it illegal for
any individual "[tlo make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstance under which they
were made, not misleading." 3 Under federal court precedent, this
rule creates a private cause of action.'
In the wake of revelations of illegal acts and impending
governmental sanctions, disgruntled shareholders have sought to
sue directors for failing to disclose that their respective
corporations had engaged in illegal conduct. Courts have been
hostile to such suits55 and have ruled that corporations have no

one be offset against the losses on the other.").
51. See id. ("Such an allocation of the burden of proof is justified by the
superior access of the defendants to the relevant facts.").
52 See T.S.C. Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (finding
a duty to disclose if information is material); see also Plaine v. McCabe, 790 F.2d
742 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding a possible duty to disclose certain financial
projections). See generally Bruce G. Vanyo & Jared L. Koppel, Developments in
Securities Litigation: Theories for the Defense, 351 PLI/LIT 9, June 7, 1988
[hereinafter Vayno & Koppel] (describing case law concerning duties of
disclosure).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 10b-5 (2001); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
54. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
55. In a 1982 article, one commentator noted that "private litigants have met
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affirmative duty to disclose their illegal acts unless governmental
proceedings are pending or known to be contemplated. 6
1. Alpha Industries: Reliance on (Irrelevant)Precedent
In Roeder v. Alpha Industries,Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit rejected a claim that corporate
directors had a duty to disclose illegal acts. 7 The defendant, a
defense firm, had paid a $57,000 bribe to obtain a contract from
Raytheon, one of the nation's leading defense firms." The plaintiff
had purchased Alpha Industries stock after the payment of the
bribe but before the company announced that one of its Vice
Presidents would be indicted. 9 The stock price had fallen from $21
per share at the time of purchase to just over $11 per share at the
time of sale.'
The federal district court ruled that the bribery was not
"material" under Rule 10b-56" until the U.S. Attorney was likely to
indict a company official and, therefore that Alpha Industries
officers and directors had no obligation to disclose the company's
illegal acts.62 Writing for the First Circuit, Judge Bownes overruled
the district court on the issue of whether bribery was material.63
with a singular lack of success in proxy suits brought to recover money damages
or restitution from corporate managers who have paid bribes or made
questionable payments to improve corporate earnings." Roiter, supra note 8, at

804.
56.

Under SEC rules, companies must disclose criminal activity when
governmental proceedings are pending or known to be contemplated. See 17
C.F.R. 229.103; see also Vanyo & Kopel, supra note 52, at 40. The litigation
described in this section concerns whether a duty to disclose illegal acts exists
prior to those circumstances.
57. See Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987).

5& See id. at 23.
59. See id. at 24.
60. See id.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 10b-5.
62 See Alpha Indus., 814 F.2d at 24.
63. See id. at 25. The test for materiality, the judge wrote, is whether
information "might have [been] considered important" by a "reasonable
investor." Id. (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens Bank of Utah v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); see also Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 693 (1st Cir.
1978)); SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Wis.
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Relying on precedent that there was no duty to disclose absent
statutory obligations or insider trading, ' however, Judge Bownes
affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's securities fraud suit.65
Other than citing precedents, the First Circuit provided no
analysis as to why there should be no duty to disclose illegal acts.
Indeed, its suggestion that illegal acts were material indicates that
the Court of Appeals appreciates the harm done to the plaintiff by
The court seems wedded to
the corporation's misconduct.
authorities holding that there is no affirmative duty to disclose,
authorities which are based on entirely different factual
circumstances.
2. Matthews: Fifth Amendment Concerns
Facing a slightly different set of facts, the Second Circuit
reached a similar conclusion concerning the lack of a duty of
corporate directors to disclose illegal acts." The defendant in the
Matthews case was simultaneously charged with conspiring to bribe
members of the New York State Tax commission and with
breaching controlling securities laws by failing to disclose that
conspiracy.67 At trial, the defendant was acquitted of conspiracy
but convicted of securities violations.6" Considering his appeal on

1978). Because it bears on the question about the competency of management,
information about bribery may be "critically important to investors." Alpha
Indus., 814 F.2d at 25.
64. See Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied 106 S. Ct. 1195 (1986); see also Staffin v. Greenberg, 673 F.2d 1196, 1204
(3d Cir. 1982); Grossman v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395, 409 (N.D. Ill.
1984); Warner Communications, Inc. v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482, 1489 n.12
(D. Del. 1984); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 128, 133
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). But see Issen v. GSC Enter., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (standing alone for the proposition that all material information must be
disclosed in annual reports so as not to mislead investors).
65. See Alpha Indus., 814 F.2d at 22, 31 ("[W]e rule that the complaint fails
because it does not allege facts giving rise to a duty to disclose."). The First
Circuit also rejected plaintiff's RICO claim because of failure to show causation
and a pattern of misconduct. See id. at 30.
66. See United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986).
67. See id. at 39.
6& See id.; c.f. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988) (holding that a
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the securities conviction, the Second Circuit held that the
defendant had not failed to disclose any true facts because the
evidence of conspiracy was thin.69
The Second Circuit's decision not to find the existence of a
duty to disclose is bound up with a concern for the Fifth
Amendment protection from self-incrimination.' This may be the
most powerful factor in shaping the no-duty-to-disclose rule.
Because disclosed illegal acts could be introduced as evidence
against corporate directors in a criminal trial, such disclosure,
courts feel, cannot be mandated in light of the Fifth Amendment.
The Matthews court also explicitly rejected the idea that
shareholders had a right to evaluate the morality of directors'
conduct.71 However, one might make the argument that investors
have a right to disclosure of illegal acts so as to avoid moral
complicity in those acts.72 For example, one could argue that an
investor who is morally repulsed by child labor is owed disclosure
of ongoing illegal labor practices so that the investor can remove
her money from the "tainted" company. That argument is not
taken up in this Article, but might provide further cause to
corporation is not considered a "person" under the Fifth Amendment and
therefore is not entitled to protection from self incrimination); see also Braswell
v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 109-10 (1988) (holding that a custodian of corporate
records is not entitled to Fifth Amendment protection where producing
corporate records will personally incriminate the custodian).
69. See Matthews, 787 F.2d at 45-56.
70. See id. at 46 (holding that defendant has no obligation to "state to all the
world that he was guilty of the uncharged crime of conspiracy"). The Second
Circuit quoted the SEC's former General Counsel Harvey L. Pitt as saying: "To
ask people to accuse themselves and indict and convict themselves is silly. So
Such a disclosure
why should that be required in proxy statements?
statement.., runs counter to what the Fifth Amendment is all about." Id. at 45
n.4.
71. See id. at 49 ("Matthews was not legally required to confess that he was
guilty of an uncharged crime in order that Southland's shareholders could
determine the morality of his conduct.").
72 See Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under
the Securities Acts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1848, 1863 (1976) ("The argument that
many investors are interested in avoiding ownership of companies whose conduct
is socially or morally undesirable as well as in making money, and that the
reasonable investor would therefore consider ethically significant information
important, has gathered some strength in recent years.").
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reconsider the no-duty-to-disclose rule.
3. Crop Growers:Sec Intent
In a 1997 case, a District of Columbia federal court offered a
new explanation for the no-duty-to-disclose rule: SEC intent." The
government charged the Crop Growers Corporation, a holding
company, with several counts of campaign finance and securities
law violations." The charges arose as a result of independent
counsel Donald Smalz's investigation of Secretary of Agriculture
Mike Espy.75
In rejecting the government's claim that Crop Growers had a
duty to disclose its illegal campaign finance activities, Judge
Kessler pointed to the Matthews and Alpha Industries decisions.
He went on to argue that the SEC could have adopted a formal
requirement that directors disclose ongoing illegal acts. ' The
Judge noted that when the SEC approved rules requiring
disclosure of criminal convictions and pending criminal
proceedings78 it "considered requiring disclosure of questionable or
73. See United States v. Crop Growers Corp., 954 F.Supp. 335, 346 (D.D.C.
1997) (finding no duty to disclose breach of campaign finance laws).
74. See id. at 340-41.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 345-47.
77. See id. at 346. The Matthews Court also noted the SEC's failure to adopt
language establishing an affirmative duty to disclose. See Matthews v. United
States, 787 F.2d 38, 38 ("Attempts to enlarge upon the disclosure
requirements... provoked enormous disagreement... among respected
practitioners and were described by various commentators as controversial,
unclear, fuzzy, and inconsistent.") (second ellipsis in original) (citing John M.
Fedders, Speech at ABA Committee Meeting on Failure to Disclose Illegal
Conduct, in 14 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2057, Nov. 26, 1982); see also George
S. Branch & James A. Rubright, Integrity of Management Disclosures Under the
FederalSecurities Laws, 37 Bus. L., 1447, 1451 n.16 (1982); Ralph C. Ferrara et
al., Disclosureof Information Bearing on Management Integrity and Competency,
76 Nw. U. L. REV. 555, 564 (1981); Note, Disclosure of CorporatePayments and
Practices:Conduct Regulation Through Federal Securities Laws, 43 BROOK. L.
REv. 681 (1977); Burt Schorr, SEC's Fuzziness on What Illicit DealingsShould be
Reported Limits Disclosure,WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1976, at 26 col. 1.
78. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5949, [1978 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,649 (July 28, 1978).
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illegal payments."79 However, the Commission "failed to adopt
such a requirement." ' Since "the SEC clearly knows how to write
specific disclosure requirements into its regulations, and has chosen
not to do so for uncharged criminal conduct,""1 it intended there to
be no affirmative duty to disclose illegal acts.
4. Exceptions: CourtsFinding Duty to Disclose
Several courts have broken ranks and held that there is an
affirmative duty to disclose illegal acts.82 However, so far only
district courts have done so." In one such case, Judge Sifton of the
79. Crop Growers, 954 F. Supp. at 346 (citing Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 5949, supra note 78, at 80,618).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Professional Care, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 110
(E.D.N.Y. 1987).
83. See, e.g., id.; In re Par Pharm. Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (finding a duty to disclose bribes paid to F.D.A. regulators so as to avoid
misleading investors); Ballan v. Wilfred Amer. Educational Corp., 720 F. Supp.
241 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (1978)
(finding a duty to disclose illegal transfers to Spanish affiliates); SEC v.
Beefpackers, Inc., [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,079
(D. Neb. 1977) (failure to disclose existence of cash fund for bribing meat
inspector rendered defendant's annual report materially misleading). Only one
circuit court affirmed such a holding. See SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir.
1996). The facts of these cases are quite specific. In Par Pharmaceuticals,
defendant directors had bragged about their success at achieving speedy SEC
approval without disclosing that such speed was a direct result of more than a
dozen bribe payments. See ParPharmaceuticals,733 F. Supp. at 675-77 (stating:
[B]y comparing Par's success in this regard to other companies in the industry
and to its own previous performance, and by projecting continued success in
obtaining rapid approvals, the statements conveyed to a reasonable investor the
false impression that Par had a particular expertise in obtaining FDA approvals
constituting a legitimate competitive advantage over other companies and that
this advantageous expertise was responsible for its success in obtaining FDA
approvals.).
The Schlitz Brewing case is also based on special circumstances: the size
of the payments, not the payments themselves, motivated the Court's finding that
the company needed to disclose. See Schlitz, 452 F. Supp. 824 at 829. These cases
do not generally hold that there is an affirmative duty to disclose, absent the need
to correct prior misleading statements. See, e.g., Par Pharmaceuticals,733 F.
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Eastern District of New York held that Professional Care, Inc.
breached its duty to disclose. Professional Care provided various
services to health care facilities, and was indicted for Medicaid
fraud." On the day of the indictment, the value of common stock
in the company fell from $7.25 to $4 per share." Because of its
illegal conduct, the company was no longer able to obtain Medicaid
funds,' which no doubt severely undermined its future prospects
and harmed shareholders.
Still, these courts are the exception rather than the rule. In
general, courts side with Crop Growers, Matthews and Alpha
Industries and hold that there is no affirmative duty to disclose
The
illegal acts prior to imminent governmental action.'
Supp. at 678. In Fehn, the facts the Ninth Circuit decided needed to be disclosed
involved a past conviction for illegal acts that potentially carried future liability,
as well as the identity of a corporate promoter which the defendant's filings had
obscured. See Fehn, 97 F.2d at 1290. In Ballan, defendants failed to assert the
Fifth Amendment interest at the trial court level, and were therefore precluded
from relying on Matthews. See Ballan, 720 F. Supp. at 241. Moreover, the
investigation in Ballan was well under way, and the court found that the
defendants "launched a scheme to conceal the investigations." Id. at 244. The
SEC has also punished corporate directors for the very particular failure to
disclose bribes paid to foreign officials. See generally Note, Disclosure of
Payments, supra note 72, at 1857. In these cases, the SEC's primary objection has
tended to be to corporation's deceptive accounting practices; where bribes were
paid out of broadly labeled "general funds," the SEC has not been unified in
supporting a duty to disclose. See id. at 1859.
84. Greenfield, 677 F. Supp. at 112.
85. See id. at 112 n.1.
86. See id. at 112.
87. See Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 777 F. Supp. 88 (D. Mass. 1991)
(finding no duty to disclose unlawful business practices); see also G.A.F. Corp. v.
Heyman, 724 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding no duty to disclose proxy breach of
trust action brought against insurgent director); Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d
761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1145 (1982) (finding no duty to disclose
bribes paid to foreign governments); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724
(8th Cir. 1979) (same); SEC v. Chicago Helicopter Indus., Inc., No. 79 C 0469,
slip opinion (N.D. Ill. Jan 18, 1980), vacated as moot (Mar. 7, 1980) (finding no
duty to disclose bank transaction designed to circumvent federal restrictions on
loans to bank executives); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v.
J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding no duty to disclose
intent to violate federal labor laws); In re Tenneco Sec. Litig. 449 F. Supp. 528,
531 (D. Tex. 1978) (finding no breach of federal securities disclosure requirement
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underlying concern for the Fifth Amendment rights of corporate
directors trumps the interest of potential investors in avoiding
companies run by risk-seekers with little respect for the law.
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN NET-LOSS AND NO-DUTYTO-DISCLOSE
The net-loss rule and the no-duty-to-disclose rule are in
conflict. As a result, one class of shareholders is systematically
deprived of the opportunity to be compensated justly for losses
arising from the illegal acts of corporations. The wronged class
consists of holders of securities who bought their shares after the
appreciation in stock price attributable to the company's illegal but
profitable acts and before the announcement of those illegal acts.88
This class suffers the loss associated with the punishment of the
corporation and enjoys none of the gains arising from the
company's illegal acts. Because of the operation of the no-duty-todisclose rule, this class cannot be imagined to have consented to
the illegal acts. Likewise, from a business perspective, this class
has not consented to the risky behavior of the corporation. 9
The case of bribery of a defense contractor provides a clear
example of this problem. Imagine a fictional defense contractor,
XYZ, Inc.. On January 1, 2000, the company's stock trades at $10
a share. The company has a $10 million contract with the Navy.
for failing to reveal domestic and foreign bribes, although a state cause of action
may exist for corporate waste). Some commentary has supported the no-duty-todisclose-illegal-acts line of cases. See, e.g., Roiter, supra note 8, at 782
("In these circumstances, the role of a disclosure system is... difficult to assess.
Disclosure of illegal conduct falling within the bounds of an expansive materiality
standard may be of marginal utility to investors, may burden corporations with
unnecessary costs, and may diminish the clarity and focus of corporate filings.").
88. This is not precisely the plaintiff class represented by Roeder in the
Alpha Industries case. See Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 24 (D.
Mass. 1987). In that case, the plaintiff claimed to represent all shareholders who
had acquired their shares after the bribe but before the public announcement of
impending indictments. See id. That plaintiff class may, therefore, have enjoyed
some of the gains resulting from the bribe.
89. Under traditional agency principles, an agent cannot be held liable for
illegal acts when the principle knew of or had reason to know that the law was
broken. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 34 cmt. g (1958).
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On January 3, the chief executive officer of XYZ decides to pay a
$500,000 bribe to an Air Force Procurements Officer to obtain a
contract to provide its product to the Air Force as well. Analysts
delight in the new contract and upgrade their estimates for XYZ.
The increased publicity the new contract gives XYZ enables the
company to obtain several deals with foreign governments. Over
the next year, the increase in earnings experienced by the company
leads the stock price to rise to $20 a share.
On January 1, 2001, the company receives word that a grand
jury is convening to indict its CEO for bribery. As a result of the
indictment, the company will no longer be able to sell weapons to
either the Navy or the Air Force. On January 3, 2001, the
company spokesman holds a press conference and announces this
bad news. In the next few days of trading, the stock price falls to
$11 a share.
Now imagine two investors, A and B. A invested in one
hundred shares of XYZ on January 1, 2000. She watched in delight
the news of the new contracts and the rise in stock price. B
observes the investment success of investors such as A and is
impressed by the return on XYZ stock. B goes on the world wide
web in December, 2000 and reads XYZ's annual report, which,
unsurprisingly, does not mention the bribe. She then logs on to Etrade and purchases 50 shares of XYZ, Inc.
Neither investor has a valid cause of action. A's lack of a
cause of action is not of significant concern. Even after the
collapse of the stock price, A has not experienced a "net loss." She
has in fact made ten percent. However, in just a few short days, B
lost forty-five percent of her investment. Yet because the
company's stock increased ten percent overall as a result of its
illegal bribe, she cannot recover for breach of the duty to maximize
stock value. Because XYZ had no duty to disclose prior to
receiving notice that a grand jury was convening, the company does
not owe B for its failure to mention the bribe in its annual report,
in spite of the fact that it gave rise to the most significant risk the
company faced in the next year, the indictment.
If there were a duty to disclose illegal acts, then B's
predicament would not inspire much sympathy. After all, if the
annual report mentioned the bribe and noted the risk of discovery
and the significance of the punishment (something it is obviously
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difficult to imagine a company actually doing), then a court could
say that B made an informed decision to invest in a risky asset.
Yet she was not so informed. The tension between the netloss rule, which prevents her recovery, and the no-duty-to-disclose
rule, which prevented her from making a fully-informed choice,
results in her inability to obtain just recovery in a court of law.
In addition to and because of the inability of the class of
shareholders represented by B to recover for its losses, the netloss/no-duty-to-disclose rules have the potential to induce a bias
towards certain kinds of investments. Shareholders cannot recover
for losses unless there is a net loss and have no way of finding out
whether a corporation is engaged in illegal behavior. As a result,
they may be induced to invest in companies that are least likely to
be affected by the discovery and punishment of illegal behavior.
Empirical studies have indicated that, in the case of bribery, large,
well-established firms suffer far smaller drops in share value as a
result of governmental sanctions than their smaller counterparts. 9°
The no-duty-to-disclose/net-loss dynamic may lead investors to
artificially favor larger, well-established firms. One could make an
argument that firms like these, which have high capital to labor
ratios, are the least efficient investments, from an economy-wide
perspective.91 The same amount of financial support could enable a
smaller firm to increase productivity more than a larger firm could.
As a result, the net-loss/no-duty-to-disclose regime may actually be
hampering economic growth. Certainly, it is inhibiting investors
from properly diversifying their portfolios.
It is impossible to get a precise handle on the number of
shareholders who, like one of the aforementioned hypothetical
investors, are victimized by the gap between the no-duty-todisclose and net-loss rules. No empirical studies of derivative suits
90. See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Defense Procurement Fraud, Penalties,
and ContractorInfluence, 107 J. POL. ECON. 809 (1999) (finding that stock prices
for the top one hundred defense firms fall by significantly less in the face of
government penalties than the stock prices of their smaller counterparts).
91. Numerous scholars have commented on the role that the legal treatment
of investments and corporations, and the law generally, can affect economic
growth. See, e.g., India's Wayward Children, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 323
(2000) (exploring how foreign direct investment laws have affected India's
economic growth rates in the post-independence era).
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based on illegal acts have been done. Searching for cases
describing these rules is not a substitute for empirical analysis
because many of these cases settle before reaching trial, and
certainly before appeals courts write the sort of opinion that ends
up in case books and reporters.'
A. Sidebar:Is There Anything SpecialAbout Illegal Acts?
Thus far, this Article has presented the assumption, as the
cases and secondary sources cited above have done, that there is
something special about illegal corporate behavior, as opposed to
simply risky corporate behavior. That is to say, is there any reason
to be concerned whatsoever about compensating shareholders for
illegal corporate behavior, over and above the causes of action
which already lie for corporate directors who fail to exercise due
care?
Without resorting to the argument that there are moral
implications to investing in a company that engages in illegal acts,93
there are two responses available. First, courts will not be
concerned about Fifth Amendment issues when the conduct in
question is not illegal, and thus will be less hesitant in finding
disclosure obligations. As a result, an individual who invests in a
company that engages in risky but perfectly legal conduct will be
less likely to fail in pursuing a 10b-5 failure-to-disclose case.
Second, illegal conduct, unlike merely risky conduct, could
have lasting reputational effects for corporations, resulting in far
greater losses and perhaps rendering the market for the security
illiquid. Directors who engage in illegal behavior show an
especially high tolerance for risk: they are simply betting that their
corporations will not be discovered or prosecuted successfully,
rather than betting on whether one investment will be more
profitable than another. Because the long-term effects of illegal
conduct on securities' values is potentially so much greater, it may

92. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (evaluating a settlement between corporate directors and shareholders
in case concerning liability for civil and criminal fines for violation of federal and
state laws applicable to health care providers).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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make sense to go to special lengths to deter such conduct.
IV. CAN THIS TENSION BE RESOLVED?

The previous Part argued that the no-duty-to-disclose and netloss rules systematically deprive a specific class of shareholders of
the opportunity to recover from corporate directors for the illegal
acts of corporations. There are at least two ways in which
defenders of the two rules could argue that this injustice is illusory.
First, they could assert that the efficient markets hypothesis
indicates that no true loss could have occurred. Second, they could
argue that criminal law so deters illegal conduct by corporations as
to make the issue irrelevant, although not necessarily
uninteresting.
A. The Strong-FormEfficient Markets Hypothesis
The first possible way to resolve the tension between the noduty-to-disclose and net-loss rules is to turn to a particularly strong
form of the efficient markets hypothesis ("EMH"). The EMH
should by now be familiar to students of corporations and
securities law. Derived from the work of Nobel laureate financial
economists such as Harry Markowitz, Merton Miller and William
Sharpe,94 the basic idea of EMH is that stock prices reflect the
expected future earnings of a corporation given all available
information.95 Traders discount the impact of future windfalls and
future losses by the chances that favorable or unfavorable
outcomes will occur.
The EMH has taken several forms in the theoretical and
empirical literature. The so-called "strong" form of the EMH
offers the best way to resolve the tension between the no-duty-todisclose and net-loss rules. This version of the EMH stresses the
role of insider trading. Even if information is not publicly
94. See Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffry M. Netter, The Role of Financial
Economics in Securities Fraud Cases: Applications at the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 49 Bus. LAW. 545, 584 n.3 (1994) [hereinafter Mitchell & Netter].

For a popular exposition of the efficient markets hypothesis, see BURTON
GORDON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOwN WALL STREET (4th ed. 1985).
95. See Macey et al., supra note 14, at 1022-23.
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available, it will be used as a basis for trading by insiders. If there
is some likelihood that a corporation will face an unfavorable
scenario in the future, but only insiders are aware of this
likelihood, such insiders will trade on that knowledge, through
purchasing options, or selling their stock at opportune times. Noninsiders would not have access to the same information, but they
would be able to observe the behavior of insiders. Based on the
trading behavior of insiders, other investors would make decisions
that in the end bring the stock price in line with what it would be if
the information upon which the insiders were basing their trades
were publicly available. The strong-form EMH thus holds that
stock prices "fully reflect" future expectations based on all
information, whether or not that information is publicly-available.96
In contrast, the "semi-strong" and "weak" forms of the EMH
down-play the significance of insider trading. Under a semi-strong
EMH, stock prices accurately reflect the expected future earnings
of a corporation based on all publicly-available information. 7
Under a "weak" EMH, stock prices accurately reflect all available
information on past stock price and nothing else." The logic of
these forms of the EMH is the same as that of the strong form.
Specifically, that trading will be based on expectations of the future
and that stock prices will change in response to information that
affects those expectations.99 A semi-strong or weak EMH,
however, denies that non-insiders are able to accurately observe
the behavior of insiders, and thus that information exclusively
available within the company will be accurately priced.
If the stronger form EMH is in fact valid, then the tension
described in the Part II might be dismissed. If a company is
engaged in illegal acts and insiders are aware, the fact that it does
not disclose those acts will not mean that a purchaser of the
company's stock will be making an investment without a sense of
the risk of his investment. Insiders who have knowledge of the
illegal act will trade in the stock according to their rational

96. See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970).

97.

See id.

98.
99.

Macey et al., supra note 14, 1023.
Id.
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estimates of the future gains, such as high profits, sales or growth
and losses, decline in stock prices resulting from governmental
sanction, with each state-of-the-world discounted according to its
likelihood. Non-insiders will observe the trades of insiders, and
thus the stock price will reflect the risk that the company's illegal
acts will be detected or disclosed and punished and will account for
the possibility of punishment. A purchaser who buys stock after a
run-up resulting from the disclosed profits of non-disclosed illegal
acts would not be in need of recovery. At the time that he bought
the stock, its price was diminished by the probability of detection
and the significance of governmental sanction."°°
Under a semi-strong or weak EMH, however, the purchaser of
shares inflated as a result of non-disclosed illegal acts would still
have a claim. Such a person would have purchased shares that
were not priced to reflect the potential risk of the discovery and
punishment of the corporation's past illegal acts.
Economists have wrestled with the EMH. Although there is
no clear consensus, the majority of financial economists side with a
semi-strong-form EMH."0 Even if a strong-form EMH is valid in
100. In some sense, this argument is the inverse of the "fraud-on-the-market"
theory the Supreme Court defined in the Basic decision. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224 (1988). The Court essentially held that, when financial markets are
efficient, a plaintiff relied on misinformation even when he never actually came
across the misleading statements. See generally, Macey et al., supra note 14, at
1029 (explaining the "fraud-on-the-market" theory). The argument described
here is that, where markets are strong-form efficient, a plaintiff is presumed to
have had full-information concerning the corporation's illegal acts even where

that information was never made public.
101. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 240 (8th ed.
1998) ("The weight of the evidence underlying the 'semi-strong' version has
accumulated to the point that there is no serious challenge today to its claim that
the market absorbs and reflects new information with great speed."). The
Supreme Court recognized this consensus in a recent decision. See Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. at 246 ("Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm
Congress' premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed
markets reflects all publicly available information, and hence, any material
misrepresentations." (emphasis added)). Recently, some financial economists
and legal scholars have begun to question the very premise of the EMH, arguing
that markets are not in fact efficient. If that is true, then the argument against
ignoring the net-loss/no-duty-to-disclose conflict becomes even stronger. For a
review of this literature, see Geoffrey Rapp, Proving Markets Inefficient: Courts'
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theory, however, modern anti-insider trading regulations make it
wrong as a matter of fact."° Because of aggressive enforcement of
anti-insider trading laws, the mechanism by which insider
knowledge of a corporation's illegal acts is translated into the price
of publicly-traded securities is defeated.
B. CriminalPenaltiesand Option Pay Structures
A second way to resolve the tension between the no-duty-todisclose and net-loss rules is to argue that unlawful acts by
corporations are now so rare that the issue is of no significance.
Criminal law, it could be argued, has solved the problem. Because
criminal law can punish both individual directors and the
corporation, such a punishment affects the value of directors' stock
options and incentive packages, and thus, deters corporate
directors from pursuing illegal opportunities.
It is true that corporations, now more than ever, are subject to
criminal as well as civil law. The Supreme Court long ago rejected
the 19th-century rule that corporations cannot have criminal
intent.' 3 Corporations can be fined "and even 'put to death' under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which allow imposition of a
fine sufficient to divest the organization of all of its net assets in an
'
appropriate case. '""M
These guidelines have created incentives for
corporations to create "compliance programs to detect violations
of law" and to "promptly... report violations to appropriate
public officials when discovered.... ,05

The empirical evidence, however, suggests that criminal law
has not eliminated corporate illegality. Bribery remains quite

Competence in Evaluating Evidence of Market Efficiency (2000) (unpublished
paper on file with the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law).
102. See, e.g., Dan Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An
Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13
HOFSTRA L. REv. 127, 133 (1984) (arguing that courts reduce the efficiency of
the stock market by prohibiting insider trading).
103. See Beveridge, supra note 7, at 730 (citing New York Central & Hudson
River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1909)).
104. See id. (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 8C1.1).
105.

In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 969 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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common, particularly in the government-procurement context. 0
Moreover, the incentive pay structures in which corporate
directors operate encourage risk-taking and illegal acts. As Judge
Frank Easterbrook noted, "compensation through trading
opportunities amounts to paying managers in lottery tickets. The
price of stock reflects the expected outcomes of the firm's projects,
so that only unusually good outcomes produce profitable trading
opportunities. ''""c In other words, a corporate director has no
reason to prefer an average outcome to a disastrous outcome. The
only outcome that raises directors' utility is a better-than-expected
outcome. What better way is there to achieve surprisingly good
results than to engage in illegal acts which need not be disclosed to
the public?
V.

CONCLUSION

Neither the strong-form efficient markets hypothesis nor the
deterrent power of the criminal law offers a means of reconciling
the tension between the net-loss and no-duty-to-disclose rules. To
avoid continued injustice for shareholders such as those described
in Part III, some modification of the existing rules is necessary.. -_
The most obvious remedy would be to eliminate one of the
rules. For example, courts could eliminate the no-duty-to-disclose106. See Beveridge, supra note 7, at 732 ("One need only glance at a
newspaper to see that criminal wrongdoing by corporations is commonplace.");
see also Andy Pasztor, US. To Charge Litton Unit with Fraud,WALL ST. J., Sept.
24, 1993, at A3 (reporting that one federal operation led to the conviction of sixty
five corporations and individuals for criminal conduct); Karpoff et al., supra note
90.
107. Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 84, 87-88 (John Pratt

and Richard Zekchauser, eds.) (1984); see also Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading,
Rule 10b-5, Disclosureand CorporatePrivacy, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 801 (1980); Frank
H. Easterbrook, CriminalProceduresas a Market System, 12 J. LEG. STUD. 289.
But cf. RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING 45 (1994)
(arguing that top managers will avoid criminal acts because the benefits go to the
firm but the consequences tend to fall on the individuals). What Gruner's
argument ignores is that option-driven directors are far more sensitive to stock
gains than the average shareholder. As option-based compensation has come to
dominate corporate America, his argument has less merit.
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illegal-acts rule. Realistically, elimination of the no-duty-todisclose rule would be unlikely to affect the amount of information
available to the investing public.'" However, it would provide a
basis for aggrieved shareholders to obtain justice. The weakness of
this approach is that it solves too much, since it would allow all
shareholders, even those who had profited from the illegal act, to
recover for the breach of the duty to disclose. Moreover, requiring
disclosure of illegal conduct would benefit the future purchasers of
a security, who would have an accurate sense of its risk, at the
expense of current holders of the security, as disclosure would cut
share price."
The second obvious solution would be to eliminate the net-loss
rule. Again, such an approach solves too much. Eliminating the
net loss rule would help shareholders who bought after the market
had processed the fruits of the company's illegal acts. But it would
also allow shareholders who had purchased their securities prior to
the run-up in share price resulting from the illegal acts to profit
from the illicit corporate behavior.
A third possibility would be to eliminate insider trading laws.
That would help make the capital markets more efficient. Under
the present regime, which provides harsh penalties for those found
to have engaged in insider trading, markets do not function
according to a "strong" efficient markets hypothesis. Freeing up
insiders to trade on their knowledge of a corporation's illegal acts
might go a long way to bringing reality closer to theory. Perhaps
resolving the tension described in Part III should merely be
thought of as another argument in favor of eliminating insidertrading provisions." ' The problem is that such a reform would run
up against all of the other disadvantages of liberalizing the insider
trading rule, which have been extensively argued elsewhere.
Perhaps the best solution would be to make an exception in
10& See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens &
Co., 475 F. Supp. 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (stating that such a requirement
"would [be] a silly, unworkable rule. It would not promote increased disclosure,
but would serve only to support vexatious litigation and abusive discovery.").
109. See Note, Disclosureof Payments, supra note 72, at 1861.
110. For a lengthy argument in favor of allowing insider trading, see generally
HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING & THE STOCK MARKET 101, 102 (1966)
(arguing that insider trading enhances market efficiency).
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the net-loss rule for the class who buys after the illegal act's results
are priced but before the disclosure of impending governmental
sanctions."' There would be some difficulty of determining who is
in that class. Modern financial economics is, however, an
increasingly sophisticated field, and economists would be able to
assist courts in identifying the aggrieved class. So-called "event
studies" are a powerful tool "because they allow the investigator to
discern whether information that is used in an allegedly fraudulent
action is important to investors and to determine the value of the
information.""' Coupled with new powerful computer technology,
which makes increasingly complex financial calculations less costly
and time-consuming, these techniques can overcome the difficulty
of defining the aggrieved class.
Any abrogation of the net loss rule, of course, puts more
power in the hands of plaintiffs' lawyers. Critics question the
propriety of such a shift,"' in so far as plaintiffs lawyers may
sometimes file "phantom" derivative actions or face incentives to
collude with defendant directors and settle against the interests of
a plaintiff class. Still, under the present regime, one class of
shareholder is systematically deprived of its right to recover. That
lawyers would take a substantial share of any recovery is not a
defense of the status quo. Moreover, the threat of litigation would,
over the course of time, lead corporations to adjust their behavior
so as to engage in fewer illegal acts. Thus, over time, plaintiffs'
lawyers would not enjoy abnormal litigation returns."'
Courts should implement this change, despite the complexity

111. For those who purchased during the increase in stock value, only partial
recovery would be permitted. That is, if the illegal act was committed on
December 1st with the stock price at $10, X bought at $15 on December 15, the
stock reached $20 on December 20 before the disclosure of impending indictment
on December 30, resulting in a decline in the value of shares to $12, then X could
recover just the $3 per share X lost, rather than the $8 per share someone who
purchased on December 20 would be able to recover.
112. Mitchell & Netter, supra note 94, at 546.
113. See Beveridge, supra note 7, at 778, 778 n.310.
114. Cf. Geoffrey Rapp, Reconsidering Educational Liability, 18 YALE L. &
POL. REv. 463 (2000) (arguing that over time lawyers' return from educational
liability suits would diminish, as would the incentive to file suits, as schools adjust
their behavior to avoid new-found liability).
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ruling on such suits would involve. Judges should seek expert
assistance from financial economists. There is simply no good
reason for judges to sit by while shareholders are systematically
denied just recompense.

Notes & Observations

